Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for

having invited me to testify today. And I want to thank you and

Senator Lugar and all the members of the committee, as did Susan,

for your determined oversight on Darfur.

With your permission, I’ll make brief oral remarks, and I’ll submit

my longer statement for the record.

The Save Darfur Coalition groups over 180 faith-based, human rights,

and community organizations from all over the United

States, from Indiana and everywhere. Together, we have worked

for nearly 3 years toward one overriding goal: To end the genocide

in Darfur. That commitment inspires my engagement. But I also

speak today from professional experience as an American diplomat,

a career ambassador, with a career in conflict resolution in

Grenada, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and as a

former deputy head of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Kosovo and

in Haiti.

Regrettably, while our coalition has made great strides in building

awareness and mobilizing activism—Susan just cited the polling

evidence of that—our efforts has had very little effect on the

ground, where it counts, for the people of Darfur. After 4 years,

after 1,200 destroyed villages, after 400,000 people dead, after 2.5

million internally displaced, after $1.4 million out of the reach of

humanitarian assistance, and another 200,000-plus driven into

Chad as refugees, the regime in Khartoum continues to pursue a

scorched-earth campaign of death and displacement against the

people of Darfur, and it enjoys near total impunity as it does that.

Today, President al-Bashir is more adamant than ever. U.N.

peacekeepers will not ever set boots on the ground in Darfur, and

I’m very, very skeptical of this ‘‘heavy support package’’ deal that

Mr. Natsios described to us today. The U.N. agencies continue to

raise the alarm about their shrinking ability to maintain the aid

that sustains those hundreds of thousands of Darfurians that are

living in misery. Hardly a day goes by now without a reiterated

warning of looming humanitarian collapse, repeated defiance from

President al-Bashir and his officials, a new report of atrocity, another

Janjaweed incursion in Chad.

Diplomacy alone patently has failed. For 4 years, a seemingly

endless parade of envoys has visited Khartoum, each carrying a

message, rarely coordinated with others, many wielding threats,

others wielding assurances of protection against those threats,

some proffering rewards for good behavior. It’s total incoherence,

and it’s completely ineffective.

The Sudanese regime has used these visits and differences to buy

time for its genocide. Envoys have been played off against each

other while their threats have gone unfulfilled. The regime has

concluded that it can act as it wishes, and who of us can argue

otherwise, with the evidence to hand?

Mr. Natsios really described, today, no substantive progress on

any of the key issues that dog this issue. The past 4 years are a

graveyard of failed persuasive diplomacy, as much as they’re a

graveyard of 400,000 innocent Darfurians.

We were really hopeful, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, when we

learned, from administration contacts, several weeks ago now, that

the President had finally had it, and that some really tough new

targeted sanctions, this plan B, were actually coming. We were told

it was just a matter of scheduling the announcement. We were

encouraged when, after having been stiffed again by President

al-Bashir a few weeks ago, Special Envoy Natsios told many of us,

in conference calls, that these sanctions were imminent. We were

even more pleased when we learned that one foreign ambassador

had been told that the President had actually signed the documents.

Frankly, Mr. Chairman, we thought that today’s hearing would

be taking place in the context of just announced plan B sanctions,

and we would be discussing how to ensure their effective implementation.

Everything we heard gave us cause to expect that. But

not now.

I just listened to Mr. Natsios’s testimony, but I have to note that,

only last week, he was quoted in the press as publicly rejecting

Secretary General Ban’s call for more time for deferral of mandatory

sanctions so that his diplomacy could have more time. I heard

him talk about the CODEL that went to Khartoum.

But I think what we’re seeing here is that the U.S. Government

itself has decided, for its own reasons, to defer its own sanctions

plan so that it, itself, can make yet another diplomatic try. We respect

that effort. We don’t question the sincerity of those undertaking

it. But, after years of Sudanese evasion and genocide, we

have to say we are profoundly disappointed by this.

The people of Darfur need our strong support now. The stark

mismatch between tough talk and weak action has to end now, before

more die and more are displaced. We are very skeptical that

the limited plan B sanctions that we’ve heard about would be

enough to end the genocide, but at least they’d be something, and

we’d like to see them announced now. And we’d urge that this committee

ride the administration hard to get going.

Experience from the Balkans, from Iran and North Korea, and

even from Sudan itself on earlier issues before today, teach us that

diplomacy must be coupled with strong coercive measures, enough

to change calculations so that ending a policy of mass murder in

Darfur becomes cheaper for Khartoum than pursuing that policy.

Otherwise, this tragedy, Mr. Chairman, will surely worsen.

Were we today discussing newly announced plan B sanctions,

then I would be making the following points:

Above all, the President—the President of the United States,

President Bush himself—would have to exercise strong personal

leadership to ensure full and prompt sanctions enforcement by the

bureaucracy. It won’t happen with anything less.

Second, with regard to the unilateral U.S. sanctions, which we

understand primarily would be aimed to choke off dollar-denominated

transactions that benefit the government, that would mean

several things. The President himself would have to direct the

Secretary of Treasury to have the Office of Foreign Assets Control

beef up its staff devoted to Sudan sanctioned enforcement. There’s

hardly anybody doing it now. He would have to order the intelligence

community actively to support the enforcement of those

sanctions. There’s no task force in the intelligence community on

this now. He would have to instruct his Cabinet to create and empower

interagency task forces to manage this enforcement. And he

would have to appoint a Sudan sanctions enforcement chief, one

that had a very, very short communications chain to him personally,

to drive the interagency process, because it won’t work otherwise.

And, frankly, I just say, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar, I

found it stunning to hear Mr. Natsios, in his testimony just now,

talk about part of plan B being actually setting up mechanisms to

enforcing—implement sanctions that have been on the books for

more than 2 years now. That’s ridiculous.

For the multilateral U.N. measures, that would mean the President

instructing his foreign policy team first to obtain a strong

Security Council resolution mandating global sanctions, and then

to build an international coalition for their enforcement, with a

dedicated envoy to lead that process. That’s what happened on

Yugoslavia. That’s what would be needed for Sudan. None of it exists

now.

Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves still at the stage

of calling for meaningful measures at all. After the latest rounds

of diplomacy have failed—I hope I’m too pessimistic, but somehow

I doubt it—we must demand that such sanctions finally be imposed.

Presuming your intense oversight to ensure vigorous enforcement

of such sanctions, then time will be needed to assess

their effectiveness. But, we would urge, not too much time. The

people of Darfur cannot survive new months and months of, ‘‘Now

let’s see what happens.’’

I also must stress, Mr. Chairman, that there are other measures

available now to this administration. Plan B would have more prospect

of success were the administration to heed your and our repeated

calls for a full suite of coercive steps, including a no-fly zone

and denying ships that carry Sudanese oil entry into U.S. ports, as

the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act authorized last fall. We

don’t see why these and other measures are not being included in

plan B from the outset, just as we don’t see why plan B sanctions

purportedly only target three persons, and, to boot, one of those

being a rebel leader, or why the administration’s overall global

diplomacy regarding Darfur is so intermittent. As has been noted

already, China, Egypt, the European Union, the Arab League,

South Africa, the African Union, all of these players have key roles

in this, and none of them are doing what they need to do right now.

In fact, we just wrote to President Bush urging that he launch

a sustained diplomatic coalition-building effort now. That’s also

long overdue.

Administration support for the Durbin divestment bill would also

have a strong impact.

We urge that the administration prepare now to take these steps

rapidly, should a first round of sharper sanctions not quickly end

Khartoum’s killing in Darfur. The only result that counts is lives

saved or lost. And, shamefully, they’ve been lost, and that’s been

something that’s been measured in the tens of thousands in Darfur.

Action—tough, wide-ranging action, is needed now to match the

President’s deep concern and tough words if the people of Darfur

are to obtain any relief from their epic suffering. The Save Darfur

Coalition’s hundreds of thousands of activists will press that demand

ceaselessly until the genocide stops. In fact, they’ll be gathering,

in 2 weeks, in nearly 150 cities across our country, during

Global Days for Darfur, to demand effective international protection

for the people of Darfur and strong action from our administration.

But it’s this body which can, and must, ensure that the administration

follows through on plan B, is prepared, fast, with a plan C,

if necessary, and, in the end, does whatever it takes to make this

new century’s genocide—first genocide its last genocide.

We urge you to press hard for that level of sustained administration

engagement, and we thank you for the forthright approach, indeed,

you took in the hearing today.

And I thank you very much. And I look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, for

inviting me to testify today. With your permission, I will make brief oral remarks

and submit a longer statement for the record.

My name is Larry Rossin. I am the Senior International Coordinator for the Save

Darfur Coalition, grouping over 180 faith-based, human rights, and community organizations

which together have worked for nearly 3 years toward one overriding

goal: To end the genocide in Darfur.

Beginning in February 2003, the Sudanese Government-sponsored campaign of violence

and forced starvation in Darfur has claimed as many as 400,000 dead, 2.5

million displaced, and an additional 1 million still in their villages but severely affected.

The U.S. Congress, two Secretaries of State, and President Bush have all labeled

Darfur a genocide, the first time in U.S. history that a conflict has been so

labeled while still ongoing. Congress and the President have followed up on their

initial declarations by making countless speeches, passing numerous pieces of legislation,

and devoting significant—though still insufficient—funds for humanitarian

aid and peacekeeping. For its part, the U.N. Security Council has issued a litany

of resolutions, including Resolution 1706 which authorized 22,500 as-yet undeployed

U.N. peacekeepers for Darfur, and two Secretaries General have declared resolving

the crisis a top priority.

Civil society in the United States and abroad has done its part as well, including

the formation of a broad coalition of hundreds of local, national, and international

faith-based, human rights, and community organizations, which have in turn organized

thousands of events, involving millions of citizen-activists, and delivering in

turn millions of urgent calls to the United States and other governments to take

the actions necessary to end the genocide. Unfortunately, none of the above accomplishments

have changed the basic truth that for the people of Darfur, life continues

to grow more difficult and more dangerous.

It is indeed remarkable that millions of innocents in Darfur, and parts of Chad

and the Central African Republic, have survived for this long, in the face of such

overwhelming conditions, and with so little positive change in the underlying dynamic

of their dispossession and insecurity. As will be echoed at over 200 Darfurthemed

events in over 30 nations on April 29, 2007, time is running out for the people

of Darfur.

These innocent victims are essentially on life-support, their continued existence

dependent on U.S. and international humanitarian aid and the presence of roughly

7,400 African Union peacekeepers. Despite the best efforts of the underfunded and

undermanned African Union peacekeeping force, attacks have increased in recent

months, leading to tens of thousands of new arrivals at refugee camps in Darfur

and across the border in Chad.

After a promised deescalation of violence failed to materialize following the signing

of the stillborn Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5, 2006, the situation

in Darfur grew worse. The Government of Sudan began a military offensive in

Darfur in late August 2006 which displaced tens of thousands of additional

Darfurians, and the rebel groups, which had numbered just three at the time of the

DPA’s signing, have since splintered into more than a dozen factions, further complicating

any potential political solution. The resulting increase in violence has put

the humanitarian life-support system at great risk, and the nightmare scenario of

a complete security collapse and the spike in the death rate that will surely follow

now appears to be a very real possibility. U.N. officials have previously said that

the death rate in Darfur could rise as high as 100,000 per month if security collapses,

creating the sobering possibility that future horrors in Darfur may dwarf all

we have seen up to now.

On August 31, 2006, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1706, authorizing

a robust peacekeeping force of 22,500 U.N. troops for Darfur with a strong

mandate to protect civilians. While this was a crucial step, it will remain merely

words on paper until there are U.N. boots on the ground. More than 7 months have

passed and only a few dozen U.N. advisors have actually been deployed. If the

United Nations fails to deploy a force to Darfur, it will be the first time in history

that a U.N. force has completely failed to deploy after being authorized by the Security

Council.

Why then the delay in carrying out the Security Council’s order? Because the

U.N. force cannot deploy over Sudan’s objections. Sudanese President Omar al-

Bashir wants to preserve the status quo, and has been thwarting the international

community’s efforts to stop the killing at every turn. He’s managed this by time and

again promising to cooperate with international efforts to end the conflict in order

to relieve mounting diplomatic and economic pressures, and then going back on his

word and once again obstructing those efforts when the pressures have abated. This

bait and switch pattern has allowed a genocidal dictator to consistently thwart the

international community’s efforts to end the conflict in Darfur and promote an inclusive

peace process. In fact, he is doing so again right now.

On November 17, 2006, the international community and the Sudanese government

came together in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and agreed to allow a hybrid United

Nations/African Union peacekeeping force to deploy to Darfur in three phases: A

light package of advisors to help the AU peacekeeping force already there; a heavy

package of 3,000 military and police logistics personnel to do the same; and then

finally a large-scale force comprised of at least 10,000 additional U.N. and AU

troops. President al-Bashir immediately went to work on weakening the agreement,

and thus far has allowed only phases I to deploy, demanding wholesale changes to

phase II and flatly denying phase III.

The international community must take stronger action to compel President al-

Bashir’s cooperation with international efforts to protect civilians in Darfur. U.S.

Secretary of State Rice put it well when she said on September 27, 2006, that the

Government of Sudan faces a choice between cooperation and confrontation. As evidenced

by his words and actions since Secretary Rice’s speech, President al-Bashir

has chosen confrontation.

Today, President al-Bashir is more adamant than ever in his resolve to oppose

a full U.N. deployment, allowing him virtual carte blanche to stage attacks in

Darfur directly with his troops and air force, or via his Janjaweed client militia.

Mr. Chairman, this record is well-known. Hardly a news day goes by without

some reiterated warning of looming humanitarian collapse, some repeated message

of defiance from President al-Bashir and his officials, some new report of atrocity

and societal disintegration in Darfur itself, some cross-border Janjaweed incursion

into Chad.

Equally apparent is that diplomacy alone has failed. It has been pursued for 4

years, by a seemingly endless parade of envoys and officials from all over the

world—from Bob Zoellick and Jendayi Frazer to Hu Jintao and Thabo Mbeki, from

Louis Michel to Andrew Natsios, from Alpha Oumar Konare to Kofi Annan, from

Foreign Ministers of Africa and the Middle East to U.N. and AU mediators, and

now Ban Ki-moon and Deputy Secretary Negroponte. Each has carried a separate

message, too rarely consistent or coordinated with that of her or his predecessor or

successor; many have wielded threats, others assurances of protection against those

threats, some have proffered promises of reward for good behavior.

The Sudanese regime is sophisticated, having long since learned to play one envoy

off against another. Meanwhile the international community’s threats and promises

have gone mostly unfulfilled, whether made on a unilateral basis or enshrined in

national law or Security Council resolution. The past 4 years are a graveyard of

failed persuasive diplomacy as much as they are of 400,000 Darfurians. Administration

talk, at the end of 2006, of enacting tough ‘‘plan B’’ measures against Sudan

by January 1, 2007, if it did not cooperate on U.N. peacekeeper deployment seemed

but the latest example of tough words unmatched, in the crunch, by action.

We were therefore encouraged when, weeks ago now, we heard that the President

and his officials had finally had it, and that some really tough new targeted economic

sanctions—‘‘plan B’’—were actually coming—just a matter of scheduling the

announcement. We were doubly hopeful when, stiffed again by al-Bashir, Special

Envoy Natsios further stated last month that these sanctions were imminent. We

were even more excited when we heard that a foreign Ambassador had been told

the President had actually signed the documents.

Well, frankly, Mr. Chairman, we thought that today’s hearing would be taking

place in the context of just-announced ‘‘plan B’’ sanctions, and we would be discussing

their effective implementation. Everything we heard, until late last week,

gave cause for that expectation.

But that has, obviously, not come to pass. After rejecting the U.N. Secretary General’s

recent call for deferral of Security Council debate of mandatory U.N. sanctions

so that his diplomacy could have more time—the *n*th iteration of that failed sequence

that has cost lives in Darfur—the U.S. Government, to our surprise, suddenly

appears to have deferred its own sanctions plan, so that it can make yet

another diplomatic try. We respect the effort, Mr. Chairman, and do not question

the motive; but after years of Sudan’s evasions and genocide, we cannot help but

be astonished and disappointed by this further delay.

As our coalition has argued in private communication and public messaging, here

and overseas, the people of Darfur need strong support now. Talk alone has failed,

whether tough or diplomatic. The stark mismatch between tough talk and weak or

no action has to end, now, before more die and more are displaced. Al-Bashir is not

the first stubborn dictator to pursue calculated policies of murder that we have encountered.

He will not be the last. Experience shows—we know it from the Balkans,

from Iran and North Korea, from Sudan itself before today—if diplomacy is to work,

it must be coupled to strong coercive measures, enough to change calculations, so

that ending the killing becomes cheaper for Khartoum than pursuing it, as is clearly

not the case now.

Mr. Chairman, were we discussing today newly announced ‘‘plan B’’ sanctions targeted

on Sudan’s leadership, I would have made the following points:

If enforced fully, the envisaged ‘‘plan B’’ sanctions would be an important first

step to end the violence and suffering in Darfur, although probably not enough

to stop the genocide.

If, on the other hand, ‘‘plan B’’ were not fully implemented and enforced—including

both its unilateral U.S. elements and its multilateral U.N. elements—

Khartoum’s murderous campaign would only be reinforced.

We would urge the President and his administration, therefore, to take all necessary

steps to fully implement and enforce ‘‘plan B’’ without delay.

For the expected unilateral U.S. sanctions focused on stopping transactions directly

benefiting the Sudanese Government, that would mean the President directing

Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control to increase dramatically the

number of man-hours allocated to Sudan sanctions enforcement; directing the

intelligence community to provide all information necessary to investigate and

enforce those sanctions, and the resources to develop that information; directing

his Cabinet to create and obey interagency task forces effective in ensuring enforcement

of the sanctions; and, appointing a high-ranking Sudan sanctions enforcement

lead, with Presidential authority, to oversee the interagency process.

Comparable focused leadership from the top was the key to success of Yugoslav

sanctions.

For the multilateral U.N. measures, that would mean the President and his administration

directing his foreign policy leadership—

First, to take all steps needed to obtain a Security Council resolution mandating

global sanctions,

And then, to build an international coalition for their enforcement, with a

dedicated Envoy to lead that process. Although we do not understand it will,

such a resolution should enact tough targeted sanctions against individuals

and entities complicit in the genocide; expand the existing arms embargo to

include the Sudan Government; and ideally create the no-fly zone called for

in Resolution 1591.

Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves still at the stage of calling for

meaningful measures at all, rather than discussing their effective implementation.

However, if the latest rounds of diplomacy fail—I hope I am proven too pessimistic,

but history gives me reason to doubt it—we do hope that such sanctions will at long

last be imposed, so that this discussion can have meaning.

If and when that stage is reached, and presuming that the President’s personal

determination and this Congress’s assertive oversight ensure that the sanctions are

enforced systematically, we can then take some time to assess their effectiveness.

But, if you will forgive me a brief jump forward, we would urge: Not too much time.

People die and are driven from their homes every day in Darfur; humanitarian collapse

is an insistent threat. We cannot afford, if and when such limited sanctions

go into effect, to have new months and months of ‘‘now let’s see what happens.’’

Additionally, there are more measures available to this administration than its

stalled ‘‘plan B’’ as envisaged. Heeding Congress’s and our coalition’s repeated calls

to announce additional coercive steps—such as leading the international community

in imposing a no-fly zone, and denying ships linked to Sudan entry to U.S. ports—

would make ‘‘plan B’’ stronger. We don’t see why they are not being included from

the outset, just as we don’t see why ‘‘plan B’’ sanctions would reportedly only target

three persons when we know the U.K. recommended more, or why the administration’s

overall global diplomacy regarding Darfur is so weak and sporadic. In fact,

we have just written to the President urging him to launch serious, sustained diplomatic

coalition-building efforts which have proven successful in the form of contact

groups in past crises.

In any case, we certainly urge that the U.S. Government prepare to take these

and other additional measures should the long-overdue first round of tougher targeted

sanctions fail quickly to reverse Khartoum’s killing, blockage of credible

peacekeepers, and constant disruption of efforts to renew an inclusive peace process.

The success or failure of ‘‘plan B’’ should largely be measured by whether or not

it swiftly compels the cooperation of the Sudanese Government on these fronts. The

ultimate gauge of its effectiveness will be lives saved or lost, a measure that is

marked off by the thousands in Darfur.

Action from the administration is needed to match the President’s concern and

tough words, if the people of Darfur are to derive any relief from their epic suffering.

With American leadership, the full weight of the international community

must be brought to bear on Khartoum’s leadership and its business partners to end

their obstruction of international efforts to end the crisis in Darfur.

The Save Darfur Coalition will pursue these goals ceaselessly, by the means we

have, until the genocide is ended. But it is this body which can and must ensure

the administration follows through on its ‘‘plan B,’’ is prepared with a ‘‘plan C’’ if

necessary, and in the end, does what it takes to make this new century’s first genocide

its last.

Enacting, implementing, and fully enforcing strong plan B measures is not the

only piece of the puzzle, however. Another essential element to ending the genocide

in Darfur and creating a stable and secure environment for civilians there is a consistent

and adequate supply of funding for peacekeeping operations. The United

States has been by far the most generous international donor to security programs

in Darfur, providing hundreds of millions of dollars for the African Union forces

there and allocating nearly $100 million for an eventual U.N. force. Despite this

seeming generosity, U.S. funding for peacekeeping in Darfur has been inconsistent

and this lack of predictability appears to be a contributing factor to the low level

of effectiveness of the African Union Force in Darfur.

While only a successful peace process can finally end the genocide, the United

States must do all it can to ensure the presence of a credible peacekeeping force

with dependable, adequate resources and a robust civilian-protection mandate as

the peace process hopefully moves forward. This peacekeeping force, whether African

Union, United Nations, or a hybrid, will require consistent and adequate U.S.

funding and leadership to be effective in its mission.

Unfortunately, to date, the rhetoric surrounding the genocide has not been

matched by a consistent commitment to request adequate funding in a transparent

and predictable way to get the peacekeeping job done in Darfur. Since at least 2005,

funding for peacekeeping in Darfur has been inconsistent and in some instances uncertain

until the last minute. This lack of predictability impacts the existing peace-

keeping mission in Darfur and sends a strong message to the Government of Sudan,

our allies, and most importantly, the people of Darfur, emboldening the perpetrators

and draining the hope of the survivors.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the U.S. Government’s failure to provide

consistent and predictable funding for peacekeepers is that it is one of the only

issues impacting civilians in Darfur over which the United States Government has

direct control. We cannot control the actions or responses of the Government of

Sudan. We cannot control the activities of the Janjaweed or rebel forces in Darfur.

We cannot control the response of our allies in this effort. But the administration

and Congress collectively have complete control of the allocation of U.S. funding to

combat the genocide.

As far as I can tell, Congress has provided every dollar ever formally requested

by the administration for Darfur peacekeeping and has generously added to those

requests in several instances. Based on that fact, I believe that the inescapable conclusion

is that the administration has consistently underestimated the need for

funding for security in Darfur and has not made consistent and predictable requests

through the regular appropriations process to meet future security needs in Darfur.

Let me give a specific example. The administration’s fiscal year 2008 budget request

to Congress contains no request for bilateral peacekeeping for Darfur through

the Peacekeeping Operations Account. This decision is based on the assumption that

peacekeeping responsibilities in Darfur will transition to a U.N. or hybrid United

Nations/African Union force by the beginning of the fiscal year, October 1, 2007.

Putting aside the optimistic nature of this assumption, it should then be safe to assume

that if the administration plans to fund Darfur security through the United

Nations in fiscal year 2008. In turn, it follows that the budget should include an

ample funding request for a U.S. contribution to the projected U.N. force in Darfur.

This is not, however, the case.

The Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping estimates that to meet the peacekeeping

needs in Sudan—both for the U.N. force in South Sudan (UNMIS) and for

a Darfur mission—the U.S. contribution should be $675 million in fiscal year 2008

to the U.N. peacekeeping apparatus. Instead, the total administration request is

$391 million, just $10 million more than the previous year, leaving a shortfall for

security in Sudan of about $284 million. Taking into account the $98 million already

provided by Congress for a U.N. force in Darfur, we can estimate that the shortfall

in the administration’s request for Darfur security for fiscal year 2008 is approximately

$186 million.

Presumably, Congress will again work to adequately fund this pressing need, but

this will be an unnecessarily difficult task given the expected tight budget for international

affairs and the many pressing priorities. I say unnecessarily because funding

Darfur security would be immeasurably easier if the administration would simply

request needed funding through the regular appropriations process.

The administration did request $150 million for bilateral peacekeeping in the fiscal

year 2007 supplemental request, currently being considered by Congress. This

is very helpful and welcome and appears to be adequate for the remainder of this

fiscal year. If there is essentially no additional bilateral or multilateral funding

being requested by the administration for Darfur Security for FY08, however, then

in a few short months the source of U.S. funding for Darfur security will again be

uncertain and we may yet again be looking for additional supplemental funding to

bridge the Darfur peacekeeping gap.

To this end, I would encourage the administration to submit a budget amendment

to Congress for fiscal year 2008 requesting an additional $186 million for Darfur security

through the African Union. I would also encourage the Senate and House to

give the administration the authority to transfer any or all of those funds to the

U.N. Peacekeeping account if deployment of a U.N. or hybrid force supersedes the

need for bilateral funding.

Additional to funding concerns, I hope that this committee will help ensure that

the Senate passes legislation protecting States’ rights to divest their pension funds

and other holdings of businesses whose trade with the Sudanese Government negatively

affects the people of Darfur. Senator Durbin has introduced, and several

members of the committee have cosponsored, S. 831, a bill which would do just that.

The prompt passage of S. 831, which is currently awaiting action in the Senate

Banking Committee, will ensure that States are not barred from doing their part

to fight the genocide in Darfur. I also encourage this committee to urge Senate leadership

to schedule a swift vote for S. Res. 76, the resolution regarding the regionalization

of the Darfur conflict into Chad and the Central African Republic which was

introduced by Senator Feingold and recently reported by the committee to the full

Senate for consideration.

While there is no silver bullet or easy answer for Darfur, real progress can be

made if substantive action is taken on the issues we’ve discussed today.

Thank you, Senator. That’s a complicated

package, obviously, and I’d just like to make a couple of observations,

because I think there is an answer to it.

I think, first of all, the points you’ve raised raise questions of

prioritization. And, as you noted, we have all these people out there

living in these extremely dire situation in camps, lots and lots of

people beyond the reach of any humanitarian assistance at all, and

no real security for any of the people inside or outside the camps.

We have the situation where, never mind the threat of military action,

even the kind of diplomacy that goes on now that occasionally

may have some little saber-rattling—never fulfilled, but some

saber-rattling associated with it, reportedly has consequences, in

terms of Sudanese obstruction of, and attacks on, humanitarian

workers in the field. So, that situation is very tenuous, in any case.

But I think our certain—certainly, our view would be that the

first priority has to be to save the people of Darfur before we can

really talk about either a political settlement that will be sustainable

in the long run or, indeed, economic reconstruction for their

return home, and so forth. They’ve got to be alive in order to do

those things. And right now, that’s an issue that’s up in the air.

There is a real challenge here in balancing the humanitarian

imperative of keeping these people alive now, and the diplomatic

imperative of moving to a situation where they won’t need to be

refugees anymore, and where they can go home and live in a self-sustaining

peace. I don’t think any of us has a clear answer to that,

how you balance that off.

I would also submit, however, that, in our contacts with the administration

officials, and, indeed, in our contacts with foreign government

officials, we haven’t found them devoting particular attention

to trying to resolve that conflict themselves. And I think that

that’s their duty. They have to really walk and chew gum on this

issue, and they have not been doing either of those things, in our

assessment.

The diplomatic track—sanctions, plan B, no-fly zone, whatever

you want to call these things—may have some important immediate effects, but really no-fly zone or other actions that would help

secure the people of Darfur from violence. But all of that stuff

really does need to lead back to plan A, which is a diplomatic process

that leads us away from a Sudan that is killing its own people

and that should be, anyway, a pariah in the international community.

And we think that it’s possible to do that with more intensive

diplomacy, with more leadership on the part of our Government,

working in partnership with other governments, to build a coherent

and a sustained diplomatic approach toward Sudan. This was done

when Sudan was harboring terrorists in the 1990s. It was done in

order to reach the solution in south Sudan. We’re just not seeing

it happening here on Darfur. We’re puzzled why. We’re puzzled

why plan B keeps getting kicked down the road, and all the other

things that were discussed in this hearing.

I think that what needs to be done, in essence, Senator, is to

identify the pieces of a formula for a long-term reconstruction of

Darfur, the pieces of a coherent Sudan policy that balances off considerations

of progress in the south against the needs of Darfur,

and then, finally, preparation, which will take time to identify both

the resources and the strategy, for a reconstruction in Sudan, as

a whole—not just Darfur, but south Sudan. But first, people have

to be kept alive, and the genocide has to be ended.

Thank you.

The short answer to your question, Senator

Biden, is no; I have no actual information. However, we did a lot

of research on these issues, once we heard what plan B was likely

to entail, in order to understand better what it does take, building

on the experience from Yugoslavia sanctions, for example, at the

end of the nineties. And all of the pieces that were described to us

that made the Yugoslavia sanctions as effective as they were, do

not appear to be in place at all. We’re told that they may be being

set up now, but I didn’t get very much assurance of that, I have

to say, from Mr. Natsios’s testimony today. Neither—certainly,

there’s not adequate staff resources being utilized, being made

available for this issue right now in the Office of Foreign Assets

Control. We know that; we’ve talked to people there. We know that

there is no task force on Sudan, on Darfur, in the intelligence community,

which would be required to identify, substantiate, meet the

legal standards for, and then enforce, sanctions against Sudanese

entities that might be designated. That’s something that’s not in

existence now in the intel community.

There clearly is no very, very senior sanctions czar in existence

now, nor do we know of one being considered for appointment, on

the order of the Vice President’s National Security Advisor, Leon

Fuerth, who filled that role on the Yugoslavia sanctions at the end

of the 1990s, somebody who was very close, very short communication

chain to the President, and, when the bureaucracy, as they

always do on these things, started making it difficult on very technical

and very labor-intensive issues, could go in there and really

knock heads and say, ‘‘Get to work. The President has given a direction.

You work for the President. Stop quibbling.’’

Finally, of course, sanctions, to be effective, do need to be, or at

least to the extent possible they need to be, multilateralized and

international. And, again, here I’ve spent a lot of time over the last

2 months in Europe—in Germany, in Brussels, in Paris, in the

United Kingdom—talking about, and pushing for, EU sanctions action.

And not only has there been no such action, and there’s none

pending, the quotes that Mr. Natsios gave, I’m familiar with, because

I was in Germany when they were made by Angela Merkel,

and they were only as a result of pressure from EU cultural leaders

and others at the time of the EU 50th anniversary event.

There’s no currently existing, nor do we hear anything about the

appointment of, somebody on the order of Ambassador Victor

Comras, who, again, during the Yugoslavia sanctions in the nineties

and early 2000, was, with a large staff, constantly on the road,

constantly harassing countries to enforce the sanctions on the Danube,

to, you know, do all of the really, really difficult detail work

that’s needed to make sanctions effective.

So, the short answer, Senator, is no.

I think if the President said to do it, and

put somebody in direct charge of it, and said, ‘‘I want this done,’’

I think it could be done in a matter of a couple of weeks. The

resources are there. In many cases, it’s a question of allocating

resources. If you don’t have a Sudan task force in the intelligence

community, well, you take people from other less-priority issues,

and you assign them to a Sudan task force. Same thing in Treasury;

you appointed yourself an envoy. It doesn’t take that long to

do it, if you’re determined.